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INTRODUCTION 
The Chicago School has had an important place in antitrust analysis 
since the 1960s. While its influence has waned considerably among 
 
**James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and The 
Wharton School. Thanks to Dennis Carlton, Gerald R Faulhaber, and Erik Hovenkamp for 
comments. 
*Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics, Yale School of Management 
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scholars, it continues to find support among conservatives in business, 
politics, and the federal judiciary. This essay attempts to put some 
historical perspective on the Chicago School, focusing on its ideology as 
well as its microeconomic and legal antitrust analysis. 
One well-known account of the Chicago School’s development is a 
panel discussion edited by Ed Kitch of the University of Virginia in a 
program honoring Aaron Director and Ronald Coase.1 His article bore the 
revivalistic title “The Fire of Truth,” and it spoke of a religious movement, 
of people who “gathered to bear witness” to a remarkable event.2 
Kitch attempted to locate the roots of the Chicago School in the rise 
of Legal Realism in the 1920s, with its efforts to examine how the law 
actually operates, rather than focusing purely on legal doctrine.3 It was an 
unpromising comparison, as Kitch himself apparently realized.4 
Alternative accounts have found more plausible origins for the Chicago 
School of analysis in the thought of Friedrich Hayek or Frank Knight.5 Kitch 
did properly fault the Legal Realists for compiling a great deal of 
observation with very little unifying theory or methodology.6 Kitch’s 
account is also notable for what it omitted. There was no mention of 
Robert L. Hale, the pioneering Columbia law and economics scholar who 
wrote about the relationship between economics and the legal system.7 
Nor did he mention Walton Hamilton’s influential 1929 article in the 
American Economic Review, entitled “Law and Economics,” which first 
gave that discipline a name and attempted to set it on a more institutional 
 
1 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at 
Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983). 
2 Id. at 163. William E. Kovacic also comments on the religious fervor. See William E. 
Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 
459, 459, 461 & n.5, 462 (2020) (“[T]he Chicago School’s leading figures and their followers are 
portrayed as ideological extremists, religious zealots, cult-like fanatics, or carriers of a 
disease.”). 
3 Kitch, supra note 1, at 164-65. 
4 Id. at 165. 
5 See Rob Van Horn & Philip Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and 
the Birth of Neoliberalism 140, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe 
eds., Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 2015) (recognizing that the traditional view on the 
origins of the Chicago School often diminishes or neglects the importance of figures like Frank 
Knight and Friedrich Hayek). 
6 Kitch, supra note 1, at 164-65. 
7 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. 
SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923) (noting that because “statesmen cannot avoid interfering with economic 
matters,” “[t]here is accordingly a need for the development of economic and legal theory to 
guide them in the process”). 
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path.8 Another commentator made a single but uninformative mention 
of Thurman Arnold,9 the Legal Realist who in 1938 became head of the 
Antitrust Division and became that Agency’s most aggressive antitrust 
enforcer.10 Chicago, if anything, became the anti-Thurman Arnold. 
Also missing from Kitch’s discussion was the single most important 
question that divided the Chicago School from most of its alternatives, 
the Legal Realists in particular: are markets similar, or do they differ from 
one another in fundamental ways? That issue sharply separated the 
Chicago (“similar”) and Harvard (“differ”) School approaches to industrial 
organization economics and antitrust policy. The residue of that division, 
which remains to this day, showed up in numerous ways. One was Chicago 
economists’ and later lawyers’ hostility toward the antitrust enforcement 
implications of both oligopoly theory and monopolistic competition 
theory.11 Another was Chicago’s narrow view of market failure and thus 
of the appropriate scope of public intervention, such as Pigouvian taxes12 
or price regulation.13 Yet another was its continued efforts to de-
emphasize the significance of market structure in both regulatory and 
antitrust decision making. Chicago economist George Stigler devoted 
considerable intellectual capital to both criticizing the theory of 
monopolistic competition14 and weakening the theory of oligopoly so as 
to make it no more than a special case of collusion.15 This came through 
 
8 See Walton L. Hamilton, Law and Economics, 19 AM. ECON. REV. 56 (1929); see also 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW 121 (2015) (discussing Hamilton’s 
institutional view); id. at 364 n.16 (collecting sources). 
9 Kitch, supra note 1, at 174. 
10 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8 at 200-01 (describing Arnold’s pursuit of patent abuse 
cases). See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 569 (2004). 
11 ”Monopolistic competition” is often used as a shorthand for all cases of imperfect 
competition that are not monopoly. On Chicago School scholar Robert H. Bork’s attitudes 
toward oligopoly and monopolistic competition, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did 
Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 612 (2018) (describing Bork’s 
antistructuralist view that “virtually denied that existence of oligopoly or any other problematic 
form of market structure other than single-firm monopoly or express collusion”). 
12 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-42 (1960) (critiquing 
Pigou’s book The Economics of Welfare); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 104-05 
(discussing the history Pigouvian taxes and their treatment by the Supreme Court). 
13 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3, 6 (1971) (discussing public policies related to price controls). 
14 GEORGE J. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in THE ORGANIZATION OF 
INDUSTRY 309-21 (1968) (criticizing Edward Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition); 
see also CRAIG FREEDMAN, The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition: Stigler’s 
Scorched Earth Campaign Against Chamberlin, in IN SEARCH OF THE TWO-HANDED ECONOMIST 165, 
165-342 (2016) (analyzing the motives and methods behind Stigler’s pointed critique of 
Chamberlin’s theory). 
15 See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 47-48 (1964). 
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loudly in the popularizing scholarship of Robert Bork, who viewed 
oligopoly as something that existed only in economics textbooks16 and 
who completely ignored the theory of monopolistic competition.17 
Imperfect competition theories threatened the core commitment to 
nonintervention in Chicago School work. Joseph Schumpeter was 
prescient in his 1934 review of Joan Robinson’s The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition.18 If her work were to be taken seriously, he wrote, 
it would completely undermine the strong presumption against 
intervention.19 Rather, the circumstances under which governmental 
action could increase welfare “becomes so extended as to make these 
cases the rule rather than more or less curious exceptions.”20 Built into 
Chicago School doctrine was a strong presumption that markets work 
themselves pure without any assistance from government. By contrast, 
imperfect competition models gave more equal weight to competitive 
and noncompetitive explanations for economic behavior. 
The rejection of inconvenient advances in economics became a 
hallmark of Chicago School analysis. Its followers were libertarians who 
were committed on ideological grounds to less intervention by the state. 
The classical liberal Mont Pelerin Society claimed not only Friedrich Hayek 
and Frank Knight among its founding members, but also George Stigler, 
Aaron Director, Fritz Machlup, Milton Friedman, James M. Buchanan, and 
Gary Becker.21 Many of them were also economists, however, and they 
 
16 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 221 (1978); see Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 
612 (discussing Bork’s “serious doubts that oligopoly behavior existed except in economics 
textbooks”). 
17 See Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and The Antitrust 
Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567, 594 (1979) (book review) (examining the 
implications of “Bork’s failure to deal with monopolistic competition”). 
18 See Joseph A. Schumpeter & A.J. Nichol, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect 
Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON. 249 (1934) (reviewing JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT 
COMPETITION (1933)). 
19 Id. at 250-51. 
20 Id. at 251. 
21 See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION 25, 44-45, 157, 204, 285 n.80 (2012) (discussing 
the Society and its members); Brian Doherty, Book Review, POL’Y, Autumn 2013, at 61, 61-63 
(analyzing the libertarian roots of the Society’s founders); A Short History of the Mont Pelerin 
Society, THE MOUNT PELERIN SOC’Y, https://www.montpelerin.org/about-mps/ 
[https://perma.cc/X8UB-LZTW] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (describing the Society’s founding). 
On Fritz Machlup as a founding member of the Pelerin Society, see his Cato Institute obituary. 
Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup: In Memoriam, 3 CATO J. 11, 13 (1983). On the relationship 
between the Mount Pelerin society and neoliberal thought, see R.M. HARTWELL, The Mont 
Pelerin Society and the Revival of Liberalism, in A HISTORY OF THE MONT PELERIN SOCIETY 191-217 
(1995). See generally THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN, supra note 5. Robert Van Horn has analyzed 
the Society’s influence on Chicago economics’ attitudes toward business concentration. See 
Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting Attitude Toward Concentrations of Business Power (1934-
1962), 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527, 1537-40 (2011). 
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liked competitive markets. Of course, an ideological commitment to non-
enforcement and a desire for competitive markets can come into tension 
whenever firms use the profits from market power to obtain and keep 
that market power. 
Because a firm has a financial incentive to use the profit from market 
power in order to maintain it, economic theory predicts that this would 
occur often. The Chicagoans thus needed an additional critical 
assumption: markets are inherently self-correcting and if left alone, they 
will work themselves pure. For example, cartels are naturally unstable, 
there are few entry barriers, monopoly attracts disruptive entry, mergers 
almost never produce anything except reduced costs, and vertical 
integration and contracting are unmitigated goods. With these 
assumptions in hand, government intervention in the form of antitrust 
enforcement is not needed to deliver competitive markets.22 
This combination of beliefs found fertile ground in U.S. antitrust policy 
at mid-twentieth century. Enforcement at that time was excessively 
interventionist. Courts often either used no economics or poor economics 
to make decisions.23 For example, the Court famously applied the per se 
rule to a competitively harmless joint venture because the rule of reason 
would “leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory 
in order to maintain a flexible approach.”24 
Here was a place where the Chicago School call to use economics in 
antitrust analysis would generate less enforcement–-and have the handy 
side effect of being correct. For example, its first proposed reductions in 
enforcement attacked decisions condemning very small horizontal 
mergers25 or competitively harmless vertical contracting.26 The changes 
that resulted very likely increased consumer welfare and efficiency. 
 
22 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1984) 
(“[T]he economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors.”). 
23 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 85-87 (“Most 
noticeable was [the Warren Court’s] treatment of economic efficiency almost as an affirmative 
evil rather than a goal to be pursued.”). 
24 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972). 
25 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (condemning 
merger on very small market shares, in part because it reduced the merging firms’ costs); see 
also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1966) (similar). 
26 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (ruling that setting 
maximum resale prices was per se illegal); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 
379 (1967) (prohibiting a bicycle manufacturer from preventing distributors from selling 
outside approved territories). 
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This side effect of being correct was critical to bringing the bulk of 
academic economists on board the Chicago movement.27 The attractive 
feature of the movement was not the ideology of less enforcement 
regardless of the facts, but rather the idea of using economics to analyze 
business conduct in an effort to maximize social welfare. The economics 
angle was the marketing genius of the Chicago School, but it was a means 
to an end, not the end itself, as would later become clear when the School 
began to disavow later developments in economics. In the late 1970s, 
economically weak antitrust decisions from the 1960s and earlier 
provided plenty of low hanging fruit. 
This movement sowed the seeds of its own intellectual decline, 
although its influence continued for decades. As economic reasoning was 
incorporated into court decisions, the marginal antitrust case became less 
offensive to good economics. Conduct that fell right on the (moving) line 
became more anticompetitive over time. Arguing that this more 
anticompetitive conduct was still benign became more difficult. Thus, as 
litigated cases trended, defendants’ conduct became more difficult to 
justify economically. The practical success of the intellectual movement 
weakened its argument for reducing enforcement any further. Indeed, 
more up-to-date economic analysis revealed anticompetitive conduct 
and called for greater enforcement.28 Making the problem worse, about 
this time (1980s) the economics profession developed applied game 
theory and there was a spate of sophisticated models of imperfect 
competition.29 Now many more patterns of anticompetitive conduct 
 
27 Indeed, one of the authors remembers being taught in graduate school in 1989 that 
economics was not used in antitrust prior to the Chicago revolution and that it led to the current 
consumer welfare standard used by courts. 
28 See George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (2010) (recounting how Ronald Coase disliked an article the author 
wrote that found the Supreme Court should have been more interventionist). Others called for 
greater enforcement as well. See Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 127, 131-40 (1990) (showing how vertical integration may result in downstream 
firms being cut off from suppliers); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market 
Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 355 (1988 (describing the “per se legal[ity]” of vertical mergers 
as having “a shaky theoretical and no empirical foundation”); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, 
Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 837-41 (1990) (examining the 
anticompetitive effects of tying). 
29 For an overview of this issue see Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
1291 (1990) (book review). See also Avinash Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of 
Entry Barriers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1979); Avinash Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry-
Deterrence, 90 ECON. J. 95 (1980); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Capital as a Commitment: 
Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility, 31 J. ECON. THEORY 227 (1983); David M. Kreps et al., 
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 
(1982); A. Michael Spence, The Learning Curve and Competition, 12 BELL J. ECON. 49 (1981). 
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could be explained and understood, particularly those in oligopoly 
markets. 
While Bork’s influential book The Antitrust Paradox was based largely 
on work he published in the 1960s,30 it came out in 1978,31 well after the 
game theory revolution and advances in modeling monopolistic 
competition and imperfect information were underway.32 Bork did not 
consider these new economic tools. His book was also quaint and old 
fashioned in other ways. By 1980 the role of intellectual property, 
networks, and information technologies was becoming well established 
in antitrust policy.33 Bork’s book barely mentioned them, and almost 
completely ignored patents. His view of technology was entirely 
backward looking. The Antitrust Paradox is peopled largely by the 
conventional manufacturers and dealers that dominated antitrust policy 
prior to 1970, and where much of the excessive intervention had 
occurred. 
Combined with this old economics was an important legal default: 
when the conduct at issue admitted of any doubt, government should not 
intervene. By placing the burden of proof onto the government or plaintiff 
to show that a course of conduct was anticompetitive, any conduct that 
could not be analyzed or explained became effectively legal. This key 
antitrust enforcement default drove the Chicago School’s attitude toward 
economics. 
Increasingly, a characteristic of the Chicago School became its inability 
to change the enforcement answer in response to changes in the 
economic environment created by advances in the discipline such as 
game theory and advanced estimation techniques. Recall the Chicago 
default: if the conduct cannot be proven anticompetitive, the right 
 
30 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Anticompetitive Enforcement Doctrines Under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 39 TEX. L. REV. 832 (1961); Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. 
L. REV. 401 (1965); Robert H. Bork and Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. 
REV. 363 (1965); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 775 (1966); Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and 
Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968). 
31 See BORK, supra note 16. 
32 See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS 257, 
259-80 (Peter Diamond & Michael Rothschild eds., 1978); John F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in n-
Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 48, 48-49 (1950); Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store 
Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978). 
33 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 
(1979) (declining to characterize a blanket licensing scheme for copyrighted music as per se 
illegal); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1982) (describing a 
consent decree containing the terms surrounding the breakup of AT&T), aff’d sub nom. 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
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answer is no enforcement. But new tools explain conduct; given a 
situation, they can demonstrate if conduct is anticompetitive or 
procompetitive. Thus, the application of tools will yield some proportion 
of cases that require enforcement. A movement that was formed in order 
to reduce enforcement had no incentive to adopt modern economic tools 
if these tended—because they created clarity—to justify greater 
intervention in some cases. It quickly became clear that “Chicago 
Economics” was defined by the outcome it delivered, not any coherent 
set of principles or techniques. 
As time went on, more unrealistic assumptions were needed in order 
to justify nonenforcement. For example, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. the Supreme Court declared that recoupment 
is not possible in oligopoly markets.34 The game theory literature 
published in the fifteen years prior to the decision stands out for its 
contributions showing just the opposite.35 The decision in California 
Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade Commission seemed hopelessly naïve about 
the threat of collusion in markets with imperfect information.36 Antitrust 
enforcement in the United States today displays this history of a growing 
separation between court decisions and economic reasoning.37 
Exacerbating the failure to keep up with developments in economics 
was the influence of parties who stood to profit from reduced antitrust 
enforcement. Conservative institutions were funded by firms that 
profited from nonintervention.38 They organized education and influence 
 
34 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219 (1993) 
(affirming the Court of Appeals’ view that “rely[ing] on the characteristics of an oligopoly to 
assure recoupment of losses from a predatory pricing scheme after one oligopolist has made a 
competitive move is . . . economically irrational”). 
35 See Dilip Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 191 
(1986); William A. Brock & José A. Scheinkman, Price Setting Supergames with Capacity 
Constraints, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 371 (1985); Ariel Rubinstein, Equilibrium in Supergames with 
the Overtaking Criterion, 21 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1979). 
36 California Dental Ass’n. v. FCC, 526 U.S. 756, 774-75 (1999) (finding it was not obvious 
that a producer-enforced ban on price advertising would have an anticompetitive effect). 
37 See infra Part II; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust 
Economics, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3153&context=faculty_scholar
ship [https://perma.cc/T8YS-4QJM] (observing that advocates at both poles of the political 
spectrum misplace the role of economics in antitrust enforcement). 
38 A 2004 report by the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, a watchdog 
group, found that Koch Industries’ philanthropy “give[s] money to nonprofit organizations that 
do research and advocacy on issues that impact the profit margin of Koch Industries.” See JANE 
MAYER, DARK MONEY 180 (2017). 
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programs targeting academics and the judiciary.39 In addition, funding 
sources are often hidden, and some influences cannot be seen, such as 
authors who receive but do not disclose financing for their research. 
While the American Economic Association has had a central disclosure 
policy since 2012,40 the law reviews do not. And economic theory 
demonstrates that funding for antitrust research will naturally be 
lopsided; there is no equivalent financial incentive to fund interventionist 
policy work because the benefits of antitrust enforcement accrue to 
consumers, who are very diffuse, not particular companies or institutions. 
Antitrust enforcement turns monopoly markets into competitive ones, 
corporate profit into consumer surplus, and is therefore a public good. As 
with any public good, it tends to be underprovided. 
 
39 See, e.g., Jane Mayer, How Right-Wing Billionaires Infiltrated Higher Education 107, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Right-Wing-
Billionaires/235286 [https://perma.cc/9D7P-FLJ7] (describing how the conservative Olin 
Foundation’s “most significant beachheads . . . were established in America’s law schools . . . .”); 
see also David Dayen, Corporate-Funded Judicial Boot Camp Made Sitting Federal Judges More 
Conservative, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/10/23/federal-judiciary-henry-manne-law-economics/ 
[https://perma.cc/9YZZ-GAP5] (describing how over forty percent of federal judges had 
attended economics bootcamps organized by the Law and Economics Center at its peak). 
Additional important conservative donors to academia across the decades include Scaife, 
Volker, Bradley, DeVos, and Mercer, among others. See Daniel Bice, Hacked Records Show 
Bradley Foundation Taking its Conservative Wisconsin Model National, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL 
(May 5, 2017), https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2017/5/5/hacked-records-show-bradley-
foundation-taking-wisconsin-model-national.html [https://perma.cc/7T8U-7HS9]; Robert G. 
Kaiser and Ira Chinoy, Scaife: Funding Father of the Right, WASH. POST (May 2, 1999), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/scaifemain050299.htm [https://perma.cc/3PUN-Q6S8]; 
Jane Mayer, Betsey Devos, Trump’s Big-Donor Education Secretary, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/betsy-devos-trumps-big-donor-education-
secretary [https://perma.cc/GF5U-RGAM]; David Gindis, Law and Economics Under the Palms: 
Henry Manne at the University of Miami, 1974-1980 (Working Paper, Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567105 (detailing Henry Manne’s 
program of financing conservative law and economics); Jim Zarroli, Robert Mercer is a Force to 
Be Reckoned With in Finance and Conservative Politics, NPR (May 26, 2017, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/26/530181660/robert-mercer-is-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-
in-finance-and-conservative-politic [https://perma.cc/CE56-9MFD]. 
40 See Dan Berrett, Economists Adopt New Disclosure Rules for Authors of Published 
Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan 6, 2012), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Economists-
Adopt-New/130257; Disclosure Policy, AM. ECON. ASS’N, 
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/policies/disclosure-policy [https://perma.cc/26PD-BKTL] 
(last visited May 9, 2020). 
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This background explains why the United States well overshot the 
mark in reducing antitrust enforcement after the late 1970s.41 Markups 
have risen steadily since the 1980s.42 The profit share of the economy has 
risen from 2% to 14% over the last three decades.43 The economic 
literature has come down solidly against the key early assumption of the 
Chicago thinkers that markets will self-correct. To the contrary, the 
evidence demonstrates that eliminating antitrust enforcement likely 
results in monopoly prices and monopoly levels of innovation in many 
markets.44 The higher prices (or lower quality) caused by lack of 
enforcement are paid by all consumers, while the profits accrue to equity 
holders, disproportionately to a very small percentage at the top.45 Four 
decades of underenforcement has contributed to rising inequality, and a 
reaction is appearing in the current political debate as populism.46 
Today Chicagoans still conflate their underenforcement ideology with 
the use of economics itself. However, economics is a neutral tool. It may 
predict a need for greater enforcement in some areas but less in others. 
 
41 See Fiona Scott Morton, Modern U.S. Antitrust Theory and Evidence amid Rising 
Concerns of Market Power and Its Effects, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, May 29, 2019, 
https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/modern-u-s-antitrust-theory-and-evidence-
amid-rising-concerns-of-market-power-and-its-effects/ [https://perma.cc/879H-9QBK] (“Since 
the 1970s, the range of conduct that would be condemned by courts as anticompetitive has 
decreased significantly . . . .”). 
42 See, e.g., Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the 
Macroeconomic Implications 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23687.pdf [https://perma.cc/35JR-74ZU] (describing 
how average markups rose from 18% to 67% from 1980 to 2014). 
43 See Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares 34 fig.3 (Univ. of Chi. Stigler Ctr. 
for the Study of the Econ. & the State, New Working Paper Series No. 2, 2016) 
https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-
/media/research/stigler/pdfs/workingpapers/257.pdf?la=en&hash=C465705E04AE21781939
8574706CAA372C2F6 [https://perma.cc/W7TD-PP3R]. 
44 For a discussion of innovation, see Giulio Federico et al., Antitrust and Innovation: 
Welcoming and Protecting Disruption (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
26005, 2019). There is anticompetitive conduct in many markets. See generally Modern US 
Antitrust Theory and Evidence amid Rising Concerns of Market Power and Its Effects, WASH. CTR. 
FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (May 29, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/modern-u-
s-antitrust-theory-and-evidence-amid-rising-concerns-of-market-power-and-its-effects/ 
[https://perma.cc/8BFZ-AZBY] (compiling the recent literature). 
45 See Joshua Gans et al., Inequality and Markets Concentration, When Shareholding is 
More Skewed Than Consumption 1 (Ctr. for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Working Paper 
No. 62/2018, 2018), 
https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_a
u/2018-12/62_2018_gans_leigh_schmalz_triggs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LE3-BET5] (showing 
that in the United States, people in the top income quintile hold thirteen times more equity 
than those in the bottom three quintiles combined). 
46 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 715 
(2018) (“American politicians are calling on antitrust to solve an array of problems associated 
with the excessive power of large corporations in the United States.”). 
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The Chicagoans embraced economics when it would achieve their anti-
enforcement ends, but largely ignored its advances in theory and 
empirical technique after 1970 because those tools sometimes proved 
that anticompetitive conduct had occurred, and that enforcement was 
needed. The movement created what might be called “Opportunistic 
Economics” by using economic analysis when it delivered the desired 
answer and ignoring it when it did not. 
The remainder of this article examines briefly the role of the Chicago 
School in the making of antitrust law, focusing on the most fundamental 
issues, including (1) the nature of markets, entry barriers, theory of 
competition and error cost analysis; (2) economic vs. legal theories of 
competitive harm, focusing on leverage and foreclosure; (3) the Chicago 
and Harvard Schools, divergence, coalescence, and relative influence; and 
(4) the importance of antitrust welfare tests. 
I. MARKETS AND STRUCTURE 
A. Market Diversity and Regulation 
One important contribution of the marginalist revolution in 
economics was the idea that markets differ from one another in 
fundamental ways.47 Important contributors to market diversity were the 
variable presence of fixed costs and economies of scale, more complex 
theories about how sellers interact with one another, and the increasing 
role of spatial and product differentiation in descriptions of the economy. 
Along with this came the view that market failure is more common than 
classicists from Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill had allowed, and 
that the optimal amount and type of regulatory intervention varies from 
one market to another.48 The result was an increasingly institutional 
approach to industrial organization economics that focused on 
differences among industries. For example, the large series of academic 
“industry studies” that formed the core of industrial organization 
research at Harvard stretched over a half century.49 Justice Brandeis’ well 
known decision in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, with its call to 
 
47 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution, 71 FLA. L. REV. 455, 
492-93 (2019) (discussing the relationship between market failure and market diversity). 
48 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 279-81 (explaining that market failures necessitate 
varied interventions). Marginalism also had an effect on twentieth century regulatory policy. 
See Hovenkamp, supra note 47, at 457-58, 484-85 (describing how the marginalist approach 
lent itself to a mixed economy perspective of regulation). 
49 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial 
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 112-13 (1989) (describing the Harvard economics department 
as “heavily committed to the historical case-study method”). 
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adjudicate antitrust cases by studying the entire history of the industry, 
was an early reflection of this approach in antitrust law.  This approach 
required a rule of reason analysis that looked at the “facts peculiar to the 
business” and “[t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, 
[and] the reason for adopting the particular remedy.”50 
The Chicago School’s answer to this conception of market diversity 
reached beyond antitrust to issues of regulatory policy generally. Their 
main effort was to develop a common theory of competition that would 
cut across market structures—something the economics profession 
increasingly understood to be impossible.51 The result was not only 
suspicion of the aggressive antitrust policy of the New Deal and after, but 
also a general assault on New Deal regulatory policy, with its sector-
specific agencies and diverse approaches for different markets. 
The Chicago School critique of regulation began from a baseline of 
perfect competition, just as it did for issues of price theory. It identified 
perfect competition as optimal and regulatory departures as a 
consequence of political processes—namely “capture” by special interest 
groups. George Stigler’s well-known article on “The Theory of Economic 
Regulation”52 never spoke in the traditional regulatory terminology of 
natural monopoly, high fixed costs, entry barriers, or bottlenecks. Rather, 
regulation was the outcome of political struggles under which different 
interest groups competed to see who could benefit the most from a 
particular government policy. “A central thesis of this paper,” he wrote, 
“is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed 
and operated primarily for its benefit.”53 
The message was that regulation is not a consequence of deficiencies 
in markets, but rather of political imperfections that permit interest 
groups to control markets for their own benefit. Further, markets should 
be viewed as similar in most fundamental particulars. Whenever possible, 
deviations from equilibrium outcomes should be addressed through 
private bargaining rather than state control.54 With this framing, analysis 
 
50 Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
51 See Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951, 952 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 
1989) (“[C]ross-section studies rarely if ever yield consistent estimates of structural 
parameters . . . .”); Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress 
Report, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 145 (2010) (explaining that the field moved away from “attempts 
to relate aggregate measures across industries”). 
52 Stigler, supra note 13. 
53 Id. at 3. 
54 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 12, at 15-28 (describing the costs associated with 
governmental regulation and arguing that such regulation can reflect the government’s self-
interest). 
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of the details of competition in a market was unnecessary. The au courant 
views of oligopoly and monopolistic competition were seen as greatly 
exaggerating the extent to which markets deviated from competitive 
norms.55 Today a standard lesson in an industrial organization economics 
class is that almost every market is imperfectly competitive in some way, 
whether it be due to economies of scale, imperfect information, 
impediments to entry, or one of many other reasons. When those 
imperfections are especially large, it can be better for society to 
regulate—also imperfectly—than allow unrestrained monopoly. 
B. Oligopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and Appropriate Antitrust 
Responses 
During the first half of the twentieth century, theories of imperfect 
competition played an increasing role in industrial organization analysis. 
One result was the rise of structuralism in the Harvard School, leading 
eventually to proposals by Donald Turner and others to break up large 
firms.56 This was very likely the high point of oligopoly determinism in 
antitrust policy.57 George J. Stigler’s severe redefinition of oligopoly and 
his aggressive attacks on monopolistic competition remain defining 
contributions of the Chicago School. So too was the Chicago School’s firm 
rejection of game theory,58 a necessary tool for understanding markets 
with only a few competitors. The reliance on price theory and inability to 
appreciate oligopoly account for much of the skepticism that Chicago 
School antitrust writing has had towards theories of harm that interact 
with market structure.  
 
55 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, Competition, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 5, 5-23 (1968) 
(dividing American industries into competitive and monopolized); see also ROBERT H. BORK, 
Monopoly and Oligopoly: The Problem of Horizontal Size by Internal Growth, in THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX, supra note 16, at 163, 163-97 (acknowledging monopoly and competition but 
disputing the policy relevance of anything in between). 
56 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: 
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 671 (1962); see also infra notes 
70-71 and accompanying text. 
57 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
Structuralism in Competition Policy, in THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 8, at 206, 206-
19 (tracing the rise of oligopoly theory and structuralism in U.S. antitrust policy). 
58 George Stigler was well-known for his rejection of this field. See, e.g., STIGLER, supra 
note 14; see also BORK, supra note 16, at 175; Harold Demsetz, George J. Stigler: Midcentury 
Neoclassicalist with a Passion to Quantify, 101 J. POL. ECON. 793, 799 (1993) (observing that 
Stigler “neither endorsed nor participated” in game theory, even though “a key rationale for 
using game theory to analyze microeconomic problems was neoclassical price theory’s inability 
to shed light on the functioning of oligopolistic markets”). 
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Cournot’s oligopoly theory59 postulated that each firm in a market for 
an undifferentiated product would take the output of rivals as given and 
then set its own output by equating its marginal cost and its own marginal 
revenue over the remaining (“residual”) demand. Edward Chamberlin’s 
advance60 was to allow for differentiated products and endogenous entry. 
The Chamberlain problem is very complex compared to the simpler 
Cournot setting and could not be solved before the advances of the 1970s 
through 1990s.61 A second important advance in oligopoly theory was the 
game theory revolution of the 1970s and 1980s.62 This work 
demonstrated that more collusive equilibria were possible if the dynamic 
nature of the competitive interaction was taken into account.63 
Competitors could sustain higher prices in the short run by realizing that 
any deviation would lead to a collapse of friendly cooperation in the long 
run.64 The literature shows that under particular conditions (such as 
valuing profit in the future) each firm will adhere to the higher price. 
In earlier work Stigler listed various reasons why he thought cartel 
agreements or tacit collusion would break down: oligopolists would find 
the contemporaneous gains from cheating on the cartel price larger than 
the gains from adhering. In some situations, depending on the size 
distribution of firms, the number of customers that would move, and 
other factors, cheating could be profitable in some cases but not others.65 
Stigler also listed a variety of transaction costs faced by cartels attempting 
to agree on a collusive course of action.66 Markets will vary in their 
information flows and transparency and the difficulty of detecting 
 
59 See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF 
WEALTH 79-89 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., The MacMillan Co. 1897) (1838). 
60 See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 71-116, 130-173 (8th 
ed. 1962). 
61 See G. Steven Olley & Ariel Pakes, The Dynamics of Productivity in the 
Telecommunications Equipment Industry, 64 ECONOMETRICA 1263 (1996); see also Demsetz, 
supra note 58. 
62 See e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 
16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, A “Signal-Jamming” Theory of 
Predation, 17 RAND J. ECON. 366 (1986); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Learning-by-Doing and 
Market Performance, 14 BELL J. ECON. 522 (1983); Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, 
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984); David 
M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); 
see also supra notes 29, 32. 
63 See supra notes 32 & 61. 
64 See supra note 32. 
65 See generally Stigler, supra note 15, at 44 (“[C]ollusion is much more effective in some 
circumstances than in others.”). For excellent commentary, see Dennis W. Carlton & Sam 
Peltzman, Introduction to Stigler’s Theory of Monopoly, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 237 (2010). 
66 See Stigler, supra note 15, at 45-46 (listing factors including agreeing on price structure 
and enforcing the agreement). 
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defections will vary accordingly. The subsequent game theory literature 
incorporated these observations and recognized them as reasons why 
some markets may be able to sustain higher collusive prices than others.67 
Chicago School legal scholars picked up on Stigler’s critique of 
oligopoly in different ways. Posner’s nuanced, progressive 1969 essay on 
oligopoly and the antitrust laws was a tour de force that actually promised 
to strengthen enforcement of the law against price fixing.68 He began with 
Stigler’s theory that concentrated market structures gave firms 
differential incentives to deviate from an oligopoly equilibrium, and that 
the factors causing these differential incentives could provide a basis for 
identifying actionable “tacit collusion.”69 
Posner’s foil was Donald F. Turner, who had just left his position as 
head of the Antitrust Division to return to Harvard.70 Turner began with 
the position that high price-cost margins in concentrated industries were 
largely inevitable, and that the only workable solution was legislation 
breaking up larger firms.71 Today many economists would hesitate to 
break up oligopolistic firms if they had arrived at that market structure by 
competitive means because their high fixed costs very likely entail that 
restructuring would do more harm than good.72 By contrast, consumers 
might benefit from breaking up firms in an oligopoly that was created by 
an anticompetitive horizontal merger or other conduct. Posner followed 
Stigler’s approach that market structure is no more than another factor 
that each oligopolist must take into account as it evaluates the 
profitability of a particular price or output decision.73 As a result, antitrust 
policy could approach tacitly colluding oligopolists by looking at the 
structure and actions that promise to make price increases profitable, 
such as the ability to raise price without detection, the likely duration of 
cheating and the difficulty of detecting cheaters and likely success of 
 
67 See, e.g., Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a 
Heterogeneous Cartel, 32 INT’L ECON. REV. 767 (1991). 
68 See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 1562 (1969); see, e.g., id. at 1590 (arguing for both remedial and punitive damages in 
price-fixing enforcement). 
69 Id. at 1566-67; see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, The Sherman Act, and 
Economic Welfare: A Reply to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1976). 
70 Posner, supra note 68, at 1562. 
71 See Turner, supra note 56, at 671. An important precursor was Carl Kaysen. See Carl 
Kaysen, Collusion Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J. ECON. 263, 269-70 (1951) (discussing 
enforcement in oligopolistic markets). 
72 See JEAN TIROLE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1989) (discussing the loss of 
economies of scale or network effects). 
73 Posner, supra note 68, at 1564-65 (“Oligopolists are . . . ’interdependent’ in their 
pricing.”). 
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punishing them, the height of entry barriers, availability and effects of 
price discrimination, the difficulty of discouraging new market entrants, 
and the like.74 
Robert Bork’s proposal was far more ham-handed. He simply denied 
the existence of oligopoly as a serious antitrust problem.75 While he 
appreciated Posner’s idea that individual behaviors could be used to 
establish tacit collusion in concentrated markets, he doubted their 
workability. More importantly, however, he doubted “that tacit collusion 
is an important phenomenon, or even that it is a real phenomenon.”76 
Today, Bork’s bottom line conclusion that nothing can be done about 
oligopoly seems quaint, simplistic, and wrong. Bork’s view that oligopoly 
simply be disregarded was never taken seriously by either mainstream 
writers or the courts. First, although the attack on market concentration 
based on evidence of high accounting profits has been largely repudiated, 
today it seems equally clear that increases in concentration can result in 
anticompetitive outcomes like increased margins and higher prices. While 
subsequent revisions of the original 1968 Merger Guidelines de-
emphasized purely structural evidence,77 mergers are the main example 
of a discrete change in market structure that can reduce competition. 
Therefore, structure continues to play an essential role in Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines revisions all the way through the current 2010 
Guidelines.78 An abundance of empirical literature supports the 
usefulness of the structural presumption in preventing both adverse 
unilateral effects and market structures likely to succumb to tacit 
collusion.79 
Posner’s more refined proposals concerning oligopoly have had some 
impact in antitrust adjudication. They were taken more seriously than 
Bork’s because Posner recognized a real problem that is well supported 
by the evidence. His ideas have had considerable impact on merger 
review. The risk of coordinated effects (tacit collusion) is higher when 
 
74 See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1428-36 (4th ed. 2017) 
(expanding on these proposals and their application in the case law and literature). 
75 See BORK, supra note 16, at 196 (“[I]t looks very much as though there is a high 
probability, amounting in fact to a virtual certainty, that dissolving any oligopolistic firm that 
grew to its present size would inflict a serious welfare loss.”). 
76 Id. at 175. 
77 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ES5W-Q26B]. 
78 See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 926(c) (discussing the historical 
development of the Department of Justice’s guidelines). See generally id. ¶¶ 925-28. 
79 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, 
and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2001-08 (2018) (surveying the literature). 
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concentration increases, particularly when there is already evidence in 
the industry of some existing or attempted tacit collusion.80 
Nevertheless, identifying tacit behaviors that can be condemned 
under the Sherman Act’s “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” 
language has proven difficult.81 Courts almost never find a violation in the 
absence of more explicit and conventional communications among the 
defendants.82 Even the “unfair methods of competition” language in the 
FTC Act,83 which contains no agreement requirement, has largely proven 
unworkable.84 More than forty years after making his proposal, Judge 
Posner drew back, mainly because the conduct it described seemed to be 
beyond an effective remedy.85 
This naturally places a burden on merger policy, which is 
“prophylactic” in the sense that it is intended to prevent anticompetitive 
performance that might occur after the merger, but that collusion policy 
itself cannot reach.86 Even a Chicago judge such as Posner recognized in 
Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC that fewer competitors in a market would 
make it “easier . . . for them to coordinate their pricing without 
committing detectable violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.”87 In 
sharp contrast, Bork argued that incipiency tests for mergers had “no 
value whatever.”88 In practice, enforcers do rely heavily on the likelihood 
 
80 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
82 See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1433(a) (“The courts are nearly unanimous 
in saying that mere interdependent parallelism does not establish the contract, combination, 
or conspiracy . . . .” See generally id. ¶¶ 1431-35. 
83 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
84 See, e.g., In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 536-40 (1983) (interpreting the “unfair 
methods of competition” clause broadly to cover parallel behavior in oligopoly), rev’d sub nom. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FCC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting the clause 
narrowly by affirming that “the mere existence of an oligopolistic market structure in which a 
small group of manufacturers engage in consciously parallel pricing of an identical product does 
not violate the antitrust laws”); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 4.6d 
(6th ed. 2020) (“[T]he Commission’s efforts to use the FTC Act to attack collusion or oligopoly 
facilitators in the absence of agreement have not been encouraging.”). 
85 Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 761, 763 (2014) (book review) (reanalyzing his former position and finding force in the 
counterargument that one should have “doubts about the feasibility of an antitrust remedy for 
tacit collusion”). 
86 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45 
(2018) (evaluating tests used for evaluating mergers involving firms in incipiency). 
87 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986). 
88 BORK, supra note 16, at 131. 
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of successful tacit collusion in assessing merger cases.89 The important 
difference between collusion policy under the Sherman Act and merger 
policy is that the “may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition” language 
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act encompasses any behavior that might lead 
to noncompetitive outcomes,90 without getting waylaid by the “contract, 
combination, or conspiracy” requirement. 
Stigler’s critique of monopolistic competition was more aggressive but 
also more defensive. He argued that Chamberlin’s theory was not 
testable,91 a point developed a few years later by Milton Friedman.92 By 
contrast, in 1967 Paul Samuelson believed that while the tools to test 
monopolistic competition and oligopoly theories were not yet developed, 
they together represented a much more fulsome description of 
markets.93 Through the 1960s and 1970s the model became more 
mainstream and applied to a variety of market structures.94 Subsequently, 
other researchers brought the literature forward with new game 
theoretic models featuring asymmetric information, unobserved types, 
endogenous entry and exit, stochastic shocks, and more.95 This literature 
also included advances in empirical techniques to allow estimation and 
 
89 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 7 (2010) (classifying a 
range of behaviors as “[c]oordinated interaction”); see also Nathan H. Miller et al., Oligopolistic 
Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry (June 14, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1494697/weinbergmillersheu.pd
f [https://perma.cc/4CCH-RUFN] (featuring a simulation of the ABI-Modelo merger using 
retailer scan data to evaluate the likelihood of collusion). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
91 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, 12, 12-24, in FIVE LECTURES 
ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (1949) (“Professor Chamberlin did not reduce his picture of reality to a 
manageable analytical system.”). 
92 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3, 15, 38-39 (1953) (criticizing the theory of monopolistic competition developed by 
Chamberlin and Robinson). Friedman believed that in its search for descriptive realism, 
monopolistic competition had rendered itself untestable. Id. at 38-41. 
93 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION THEORY, at 105, 108 n.5 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967). 
94 See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum 
Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 308 (1977) (analyzing firms facing different cost 
structures and demand elasticities); Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside 
Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 141 (1979) (examining an example of a two-industry economy with 
a second commodity). 
95 See, e.g., Steven Berry et al., Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical 
Industrial Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 44, 44-45 (2019) (using modern game theory to 
incorporate, inter alia, firm entry conditions); Aviv Nevo, Mergers with Differentiated Products: 
The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry, 31 RAND J. ECON. 395, 400 (2000) (adjusting for 
unobserved product characteristics); see also Timothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, 
The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics: An Overview, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 371 (1987) 
(discussing the empirical progress that had already occurred by the 1980s). 
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testing.96 Indeed, because there are vanishingly few perfectly competitive 
markets, the models and methods that accommodate imperfect and 
monopolistic competition are the most commonly used in the empirical 
literature. 
Models of imperfect competition are also now used to estimate the 
unilateral price effects likely to result from a merger.97 A classic setting is 
an oligopoly where each firm produces a portfolio of differentiated 
products such as cereal, beer, automobiles, or media. Modern 
techniques—with appropriate data—can measure how closely the 
products of the merging firms compete with one another. Mergers of 
products that consumers judge to be closer substitutes permit larger price 
increases, all else equal. When detailed data or the right setting are not 
available, the plaintiff can generate an estimate of likely harm by using 
simpler calculations such as UPP (“upward pricing pressure”) which relies 
on the theory of monopolistic competition but requires a knowledge only 
of margin and diversion or market shares.98 
C. Barriers to Entry 
Harvard School economist Joe S. Bain had done pioneering work on 
entry barriers in the 1950s.99 Bain defined entry barriers as any market 
factor that blocked entry while yet permitting the firms in the market to 
charge above cost prices.100 That definition was completely indifferent to 
whether the source of the entry barrier or the defendant’s conduct was 
 
96 See, e.g., Steven Berry et al., Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 63 ECONOMETRICA 
841 (1995). 
97 These models generally do not track the orthodox theory of monopolistic competition 
because they do not presume that entry is free. Indeed, they condemn mergers only if entry 
barriers are sufficient to suggest that higher post-merger prices will not be disciplined by new 
entry. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, supra note 89, § 9 (“A merger is not likely to enhance 
market power if entry into the market is so easy that the merged firm and its remaining rivals 
in the market . . . could not profitably raise price . . . compared to the level that would prevail 
in the absence of the merger.”). 
98 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: 
An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2010) (making 
the case for using UPP as a “simple and speedy indicator” of whether a proposed merger is 
likely to raise prices). 
99 See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 1 (2d prtg. 1962) (examining “the character 
and significance of the ‘condition of entry’ to manufacturing industries”). Bain was educated at 
Harvard but spent most of his career at the University of California at Berkeley. See HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 8, at 213. 
100 See BAIN, supra note 99, at 3 (defining entry barriers as “the extent to which 
established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without 
attracting new firms to enter the industry”). 
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socially desirable. Bain wanted to know only whether the conditions of 
entry tended to shelter the exercise of monopoly power. 
By contrast, the Stigler/Chicago School definition of entry barriers was 
much more normative, describing them as “a cost of producing . . . which 
must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne 
by firms already in the industry.”101 One difference between the Bain and 
Stigler approaches occurs in the presence of fixed costs plus economies 
of scale, which may give a decisive advantage to incumbent firms. For 
example, if minimum efficient scale in a market is 30% of sales at the 
competitive price, three firms already in that market can collectively 
charge above cost prices without incurring entry. This makes scale 
economies a qualifying entry barrier under the Bainian definition but not 
the Stiglerian definition, because the difficulties faced by the fourth firm 
are no greater than those overcome by the first three.102 Network effects 
can operate in the same way, giving early—and perhaps lucky—entrants 
a decisive advantage.103 
Stigler’s point was that there is nothing undesirable about scale 
economies or network effects. However, Stigler is incorrect, first because 
those forces will cause different effects depending on the setting, and 
second, the welfare economics may not be positive unless every entry 
barrier simply returns appropriate gains to an efficient, foresighted firm. 
If not, they may create cost savings or benefit increases, but they also can 
create higher prices, lower quality, and less innovation.104 Importantly, 
antitrust law does not punish firms for taking advantage of high entry 
barriers and overcoming risk. Rather, the impact of entry barriers is 
relevant to antitrust because they operate as part of the environment 
within which conduct must be evaluated.105 
 
101 STIGLER, supra note 14, at 67; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting the difference between the two tests but finding it 
unnecessary to resolve the question). 
102 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 47-48 (1982) (finding that 
economies of scale are an entry barrier for Bain, but not for Stigler “so long as entrants have 
access to the same cost function”); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and 
Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973). 
103 Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the 
Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 91-92 (2001) (arguing that network effects are frequently 
insurmountable for new entrants, absent another substantial competitive advantage over 
incumbents). 
104 See Berry et al., supra note 95, at 45 (2019) (identifying welfare effects for consumers 
as ranging from ambiguous to altogether absent). 
105 For example, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines section 9 discuss the role of entry 
barriers in evaluating a merger. Higher entry barriers allow more exercise of any new market 
power by the combined firm. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, supra note 116, § 9. 
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In Stigler’s defense, he was writing against a background of 
structuralism and very weak requirements for anticompetitive conduct by 
dominant firms.106 If one thinks of antitrust violations as being inherently 
without fault, then the Stigler definition makes more sense. In a system 
where conduct is evaluated from a more neutral starting point, however, 
it does not serve any useful purpose. For example, if a large firm in an 
industry subject to significant scale economies excludes a rival by filing a 
fraudulent patent infringement action,107 the question is whether the 
conduct realistically threatens to prolong or enlarge the defendant’s 
market power while deterring entry. Simply saying that the conduct is 
beyond challenge because any new firms would face the same entry costs 
as the dominant firm had faced serves to protect harmful monopoly. 
D. Market Structure and Mergers 
The Chicago School was itself divided on merger policy. Bork largely 
denied the theory of oligopoly and believed that all mergers except those 
to near monopoly should be lawful.108 Posner’s position was more relaxed 
than existing law at that time, but not nearly as extreme as Bork’s. He 
would be more likely to condemn mergers in markets where the four 
largest firms accounted for more than 60% of the market.109 
In the 1980s both the Supreme Court and government enforcement 
policy began to deemphasize the role of pure structure and added other 
factors, including nonstructural features bearing on the risk of collusion, 
barriers to entry, and efficiencies.110 Even so, structural features have 
always been central to the analysis of horizontal mergers, given the fear 
that they might facilitate collusion or collusion-like behavior. They remain 
a dominant feature in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines for 
collusion-facilitating mergers.111 
 
106 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 206-19 (discussing structuralism and U.S. 
antitrust policy). 
107 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173 
(1965) (considering whether a firm’s maintenance and enforcement of a fraudulent patent 
against a rival can constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act); see also 4 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 706 (explaining how bad faith patent infringement actions are 
exclusionary under Section 2). 
108 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
109 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 112 (1976) (“There is little basis in current thinking 
for automatic intervention in markets in which the four largest firms have a combined market 
share of less than 60 percent.”). 
110 See Demsetz, Industry Structure, supra note 102 at 5 (commenting on need to look at 
reasons for high concentration levels). 
111 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, supra note 116, § 7 (discussing the structural features that 
make a market more vulnerable to coordinated conduct). 
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By contrast, the dramatic rise of “unilateral effects” merger analysis112 
does not fit into Chicago School antitrust economics at all. As noted 
previously, the School was strongly resistant to monopolistic competition 
analysis. Under monopolistic competition theory, firms can profit by 
differentiating their products so as to create greater distance between 
themselves and their nearest competitors. Unilateral effects theory 
shows that firms can raise prices by merging with rivals that are close in 
product space, leaving a lower cross-elasticity of demand between their 
new set of products and their closest remaining rivals.113 Unilateral effects 
theory additionally requires a barrier (in the Bainian sense) such that 
entrants cannot enter in a timely, likely, and sufficient manner and 
incumbents cannot quickly reposition to replace the lost competition.114 
Models of vertical relationships that include bargaining and 
sophisticated econometrics can be used to evaluate vertical mergers, 
disposing of Bork’s strong conclusion that vertical mergers are virtually 
never anticompetitive. For example, as a result of a vertical acquisition a 
firm with a significant position in a primary market might be able to 
increase prices if revenue losses at that level are more than offset by 
captured sales at a secondary level. The techniques are similar to those 
used to evaluate the unilateral effects of horizontal mergers.115 The 
Government Agencies’ recently released draft Vertical Merger Guidelines 
discuss several of these possibilities.116 
As the discipline of economics has become richer and more able to 
reflect the true economy over time, realistic elements such as entry and 
mobility barriers have become better understood. The value of a brand, 
as well as the difficulty of creating intangible assets such as reputation for 
quality, internal economies of scope, organizational culture, and the like 
are now carefully modeled in the literature.117 In addition, regulatory 
barriers such as license requirements, intellectual property, creation of 
distribution channels and so forth, all combine to mean that entry 
barriers are common. The rise of the digital economy and the impact of 
 
112 Id. § 6 (describing different ways in which the merger of two firms may, in itself, 
unilaterally and substantially reduce competition). 
113 See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 914. 
114 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
116 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1561715/p810034verticalm
ergerguidelinesdraft.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEV2-QKQV]. Examples 3 and 6 show how vertical 
mergers could produce anticompetitive effects. Id. at 5, 6. 
117 For further explanation of some of these concepts, see PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, 
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1992) and DAVID KREPS & JAMES BARON, STRATEGIC 
HUMAN RESOURCES (1999). 
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scale, scope, network effects and the power of an installed base show that 
entry barriers in many growing industries are getting bigger, not 
smaller.118 
E. Leverage, Foreclosure, and Exclusion 
The term “leverage” means different things, but generally refers to the 
idea that a firm with power in one market can use it as a “lever” to extend 
that power into a second market. The Chicago critique of the leverage 
theory rested on the premise that the demand for strong complements, 
such as a typewriter and a ribbon, is based on consumers’ willingness to 
pay for the package.119 The idea that someone can earn additional 
monopoly profits by combining complementary goods is thus an 
economic fallacy. The critique was aimed at decisions such as Justice 
Brandeis’s opinion in Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development 
Corp., where the seller of a patented ice box required buyers to purchase 
its own dry ice, an essential refrigerant.120 The tying arrangement did not 
exclude anyone because dry ice was a common unpatentable commodity 
and the ice box itself, although patented, was never shown to dominate 
any market. 
But Brandeis was not concerned about use of the tie to exclude rivals. 
Rather, it was the possibility that it could produce an overcharge by 
enabling the patentee “to derive its profit, not from the invention on 
which the law gives it a monopoly but from the unpatented supplies with 
which it is used.”121 If a monopoly could be contractually expanded in this 
way, Justice Brandeis opined, a patentee “might conceivably monopolize 
the commerce in a large part of unpatented materials used in its 
manufacture.”122 
Brandeis did not invent the patent leverage theory. It originated in 
patent law nearly a century earlier, long before the Sherman Act was 
passed, in patent exhaustion cases holding that patentees “are entitled to 
 
118 See Market Structure & Antitrust Subcomm., Stigler Comm. on Digital Platforms, in 
FINAL REPORT 23, 119-21 (Stigler Ctr. for the Study of the Econ. & the State ed., 2019) (noting that 
“certain characteristics of digital technology” enable the creation of entry barriers). 
119 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 
20 (1957) (“[T]he tying sale is only a means of utilizing effectively a power already 
possessed . . . .”); see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 925, 929, 933-35 (1979) (arguing that consumers only care about the total price of a 
product’s components, so a seller with a monopoly on one component cannot extract 
additional profit by monopolizing a second component). 
120 Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931). 
121 Id. at 31-32 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502, 517 (1917)). 
122 Id. at 32. 
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but one royalty for a patented machine.”123 As a result patent doctrine 
forbad a patentee from selling a patented device and then attempting to 
collect royalties a second time through the use of post-sale restraints.124 
In his critique of tying, Ward Bowman showed that in a very simple 
setting one cannot enlarge monopoly profits simply by tying two 
complements. Consumers would pay more for one product only if the 
price of the other product were proportionately reduced. This is known 
as the theory of One Monopoly Rent or Single Monopoly Profit. But it is a 
result that can easily be broken if the setting is made more realistic. For 
example, gains from tying can arise from second degree price 
discrimination. The patentee could tie overpriced dry ice, reduce the price 
of the box, and earn higher profits by both expanding use of the device 
and earning more from high intensity users of the combination. Such a tie 
would produce uncertain but likely positive welfare effects, particularly 
since its effect would generally be to increase output.125 This type of tie is 
extremely common.126 
While Bowman’s argument is widely identified with the Chicago 
School’s attack on leverage, the arguments had appeared much earlier in 
economists’ disputes about vertical integration.127 Already in the 1930s 
New York University economist Myron Watkins had observed that 
leverage as Brandeis characterized it was a fallacy: a price increase in the 
tying product would impose a “handicap” upon distribution of the second 
article.128 The result was that any advantage from a price change in one 
article would be offset by a “commensurate disadvantage” in the other.129 
 
123 Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1863). 
124 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 311, 364-65 (2009) (stating that the “first sale” doctrine prevented patentees from 
extracting additional revenue from “downstream sales”). 
125 See Erik N. Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust 
Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 928-44 (2010) (finding that second-degree price discrimination is 
often welfare increasing). 
126 Consider razors and razor blades, printers and ink cartridges, mainframes and punch 
cards, and coffee machines and pods. 
127 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, 
and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 987, 994 (2014) (“One of the most astute observers of 
vertical integration was Columbia economist John Maurice Clark, who rejected the ‘leverage’ 
or ‘double monopoly profit’ theory of vertical integration in 1923 in his book on the economics 
of fixed costs.”). 
128 See MYRON WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE 220-21 (3d ed. 1940). 
129 See id. John Maurice Clark had critiqued the theory even earlier, in his 1923 book on 
fixed costs. See Hovenkamp, supra note 127, at 987-89 (discussing J. MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 136-137 (1923)). Other economists, such as MIT’s Morris 
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Under Chicago doctrine a patent is an investment which the inventor 
should be allowed to monetize without limit because this will efficiently 
stimulate more innovation. This simplistic argument does not hold up 
under scrutiny; in the right circumstances a patent can provide the sort of 
market power that can be used to carry out illegal conduct such as 
exclusion in other markets. The FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. case is an 
example.130 Qualcomm would only sell chips on which it had a monopoly 
to handset makers who both licensed its patents and agreed not to 
challenge them.131 Despite having signed a contract promising to license 
those patents on fair and reasonable terms (FRAND), it refused to license 
them to rival chip makers.132 In addition, it employed loyalty rebates to 
prevent customers from sourcing chips for their new products from rival 
chip entrants, thus preserving a monopoly in chips.133 The whole strategy 
was monetized through supra-competitive patent royalties, all of which 
were bilaterally negotiated, secret, and could not be challenged in court 
without the handset maker losing access to chip supply. This type of more 
complex setting—of which there are many modeled in the modern 
literature—demonstrates the manifold ways that patents can be used to 
harm competition. 
During its heyday, the leverage theory was influential and largely 
accounts for development of the per se rule against tying, which did not 
even require a showing of foreclosure, or market exclusion. It was an 
“extraction” theory rather than a foreclosure theory. The tying plaintiff 
could succeed by showing that a “substantial volume” of commerce was 
 
Adelman, also rejected Justice Brandeis’ version of the leverage theory. See M.A. Adelman, 
Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 45 (1949) (arguing that the primary concern 
with vertical integration is market foreclosure); see also William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, 
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 944 (1952) (explaining that vertical integration 
forecloses access to a market by competing suppliers). Writing in 1954, regulatory economist 
Alfred E. Kahn spoke in similar terms, describing tying arrangements as occurring on the 
“[b]orderline between [c]ompeting and [f]oreclosing.” Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and Economic 
Appraisal of the “New” Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 328 (1954). 
130 FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 108-
09), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420925 (explaining how 
Qualcomm used discriminatory patent licensing to violate antitrust laws). 
131 Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 673. 
132 Id. at 671-72. 
133 Id. at 722 (“In sum, Qualcomm engaged in anticompetitive conduct toward BlackBerry 
by conditioning chip supply assurances on BlackBerry signing a Qualcomm patent license 
agreement and by paying BlackBerry chip incentive funds that functionally required BlackBerry 
to buy Qualcomm modem chips, to the exclusion of rivals’ modem chips.”). 
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covered by the tie.134 The Harvard School was not responsible for these 
developments. Harvard School scholars either rejected the theory or 
refused to defend it.135 For example, Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner did 
not defend it in their 1959 book on antitrust policy, roughly 
contemporaneous with Bowman’s article.136 Even before Bork published 
The Antitrust Paradox, Areeda spoke strongly against it.137 
The theory that more accurately separated the Chicago and Harvard 
schools was “foreclosure,” or the idea that certain types of exclusive 
contracting or other practices could exclude rivals or raise their costs. The 
dominant firm could then charge a higher price. That theory did not 
depend on the mistaken arithmetic of vertical leverage, although it did 
reflect the Harvard belief that barriers to entry were more significant and 
pervasive than Chicago theory acknowledged. Indeed, Bork’s critique of 
foreclosure largely identified it with leverage by assuming that entry 
would occur any time a firm attempted to charge more than the 
competitive price for a tied good. When that assumption is relaxed, 
foreclosure is possible, particularly when the practice itself makes the 
structure of the affected market less competitive.138 Thus, for example, 
while Kaysen and Turner did not embrace the “double monopoly profits” 
theory of tying, they did accept that tying arrangements in the presence 
of power served to create entry barriers in the market for the tied 
product.139 Under their theory a tie raised entry barriers for the tied good 
“to the level of those in the market for the tying good.”140 Their example 
was IBM’s tie of computer punch cards.141 While entry into the punch card 
market was easy, entry into computer manufacturing was not.142 They 
declined to extend this per se rule to exclusive dealing, because in their 
 
134 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶¶ 1721, 1721d3(c) (stating that the per se 
rule requires “power over the tying product and coverage of a ‘not insubstantial’ volume of 
commerce in the tied product”). 
135 Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 124, at 366 (“[T]he leveraging theory never held a 
secure place in . . . the writings of Harvard School economists and lawyers . . . .”). 
136 See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959). 
137 See Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1127, 1138 (1976) (arguing that tying product overcharges are inherently offset by price 
reductions in the tied product). 
138 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 524-25 (1985) (discussing how prices charged by incumbent firms can affect entry 
into a market); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 
837 (1990) (tying allows a firm with a monopoly in one market to foreclose sales in a related 
market); 
139 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 136, at 157-58. 
140 Id. at 157. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 157-58. 
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view an exclusive dealing contract “may provide substantial gains in 
certainty and ability to plan forward . . . in a market in which supplies or 
demands fluctuate unpredictably and widely.”143 Kaysen and Turner 
exaggerated the differences between exclusive dealing and tying, both of 
which can involve entrepreneurial risk sharing. Indeed, today the 
distinction between exclusive dealing and tying often fades into the 
hyper-technical question whether the tie involves separate products.144 
The Chicago position on foreclosure was, once again, insistence that 
markets will work themselves pure. A firm claiming foreclosure was 
simply a whining loser who was unable to compete in the marketplace.145 
This assumption and attitude have been undermined by an enormous 
economics literature demonstrating the existence of profitable 
foreclosure strategies, both in theory and in the marketplace.146 The 
government’s draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines also identify many 
circumstances in which foreclosure of rivals is profitable and 
anticompetitive.147 
The law of exclusionary pricing engaged two of Chicago’s most 
cherished themes. First was its doubts about the existence and 
significance of entry barriers, which the law expressed in a strict 
“recoupment” requirement. Second was a belief that the basic practice 
of driving rivals out of business by charging very low prices was so risky in 
relation to realistic payoffs as to be irrational, which was the position that 
Bork took in The Antitrust Paradox.148 An irrational practice would not be 
undertaken by a meritorious competitor and therefore plaintiffs must be 
 
143 Id. at 159. 
144 See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18-25 (1984) (analyzing whether 
exclusive anesthesiology contract involved separate products or a package). In the franchise 
context, see Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1982), in which 
what was essentially exclusive dealing was characterized by the plaintiffs as tying the Baskin-
Robbins trademark (the alleged tying product) and ice cream (the alleged tied product). 
145 In The Limits of Antitrust, Easterbrook wrote that 
every successful competitive practice has victims. The more successful a new 
method of making and distributing a product, the more victims, the deeper the 
victims’ injury. . . . It is a neverending [sic] process of weeding out the sluggish and 
the inefficient. Yet those who lose in the competitive struggle do not view the 
outcome as just. 
Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 5. 
146 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230 (1986) (summarizing this position 
during the heyday of this debate). 
147 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, supra note 116, § 5(a) (describing scenarios in which 
foreclosure could be profitable and anticompetitive). 
148 BORK, supra note 16, at 144-59 (describing the theory and practice of predatory pricing 
with skepticism). 
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inefficient firms using the courts to try to make up for their failings. 
Areeda and Turner’s well known 1975 law review article on predatory 
pricing, which preceded The Antitrust Paradox by three years, reflected 
similar concerns, although less vehemently. Areeda and Turner first 
asserted a recoupment requirement, although they did not elaborate on 
it in much detail, except for an insistence that the defendant be a 
“monopolist.”149 They also proposed the average variable cost test for 
predatory pricing, which made it extremely difficult to prove.150 Indeed, 
even Judge Posner, whose views diverged from Bork’s, described the 
Areeda-Turner test as “toothless.”151 The Supreme Court has adopted 
both prongs of the Areeda-Turner test,152 although the practical result has 
come very close to the Chicago School result—namely, predation 
plaintiffs virtually always lose. 
Modern courts have made predatory pricing effectively impossible to 
prove. For example, Brooke Group assumes away all oligopoly cases in 
contravention of economic theory.153 Average variable cost tests 
eliminate liability for all products with low or zero marginal costs like 
airline seats or digital goods. 
F. Error Cost Analysis 
One important element of the Chicago School’s ideology was its 
analysis of error costs that put large weight on type one errors, or false 
positives, and very little weight on type two errors, or false negatives.154 
 
149 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) (“[T]he classically-feared case of 
predation has been the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals 
out of the market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence 
of competition.”); see also passim, limiting discussion to “monopolists.” ; cf. 3A AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶¶ 725-26 (arguing for structural query similar to that in 
monopolization cases generally, but against a specific recoupment requirement because it 
limits claims against defendants whose predatory pricing was irrational). 
150 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 149, at 716-18. 
151 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 219 (2d ed. 2001); see also POSNER, supra note 
109, at 188-89 (describing Posner’s own theory of predatory pricing as requiring either a price 
below short-run marginal cost or a price below long-run marginal cost with intent to exclude). 
152 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 
(2007) (most explicitly demonstrating the adoption of this position). 
153 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
154 See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 15 (“In which direction should these rules err? For 
a number of reasons, errors on the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable.”); 
see also Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust 
Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334 (2020) (analyzing platform acquisitions of startups to show 
how false negatives can lead to monopoly); Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric 
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Given the Chicago assumption that markets tend to be self-correcting, 
type two errors—where the court fails to see anticompetitive conduct 
that actually exists—are not really problematic because the market itself 
will correct the situation.155 By contrast, false identification of harmful 
monopoly tends not to be self-correcting because a court blocks the 
efficient conduct for a long time. 
This argument is part and parcel with the Chicago School’s belief that 
competitive equilibria are more robust and more durable than oligopoly, 
monopolistic competition, monopoly, or any alternative. But invalidating 
that premise largely undermines the Chicago approach to error costs. If 
we reverse the premise and assume that markets tend more naturally to 
situations of market power, then the opposite presumption is warranted. 
Economic theory and evidence developed over the last forty years 
strongly support the reversed premise. Game theory teaches us that 
there are many settings in which rivals find it in their interest to engage in 
collusion or collusion-like behavior. Simple models demonstrate that 
mergers to monopoly are profitable for all firms. The literature includes 
many profitable strategies for exclusion; these allow a (typically) larger 
firm to drive its rivals out of the industry or into a niche position using, for 
example, its profit to reward a collaborator or its market share as an 
inducement. Given the strong incentive that firms have to cease 
competing, and the strong ability they have to reduce competition in the 
absence of antitrust laws, it is economically naïve to assume that markets 
will naturally tend toward competition. 
II. INFLUENCE ON ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Chicago and Harvard Schools 
The Chicago School’s influence on antitrust decision making in the 
federal courts has been more ideological than technical. In choosing 
technical rules, the Supreme Court has almost always looked to the 
 
Stakes in Antitrust Litigation 2-4 (Mar. 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563843 (showing that litigation 
against dominant firms is systematically biased against challengers); cf. Jonathan B. Baker, 
Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 1, 2 (2015) (arguing that antitrust conservatives “systematically overstate the incidence and 
significance of false positives [and] understate the incidence and significance of false negatives 
. . . .”). 
155 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 15 (“[T]he economic system corrects 
monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors. . . . [I]n many cases the costs of 
monopoly wrongly permitted are small, while the costs of competition wrongly condemned are 
large.”). 
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Harvard School. One important reason for this is that Chicago School 
positions were stated with extreme breadth but weak evidentiary 
support. The main culprit here was Robert Bork, whose views often 
reached far beyond the evidence. 
But Chicago School scholarship overreached in other ways. For 
example, Lester Telser’s argument that resale price maintenance (“RPM”) 
might be economically efficient by reducing the opportunities for harmful 
free riding was brilliant, but it described only a subset of RPM practices.156 
While the argument was later offered as a general explanation for RPM, 
by its own terms it was limited to instances where manufacturers would 
want it. An equally robust theory was the idea that RPM was instigated 
by dealers who were seeking a way to fix their own prices or perhaps at 
the behest of a powerful local dealer or dealer cartels who insisted on 
maintained prices for their own benefit.157 
Much of the Chicago School’s disdain for the law of vertical restraints 
flows from its severe doubts about monopolistic competition. For 
example, members of the Chicago School rejected the idea that so-called 
“intrabrand” cartels were a significant problem, essentially rejecting the 
possibility of single brand cartels in differentiated markets.158 While the 
Supreme Court wisely overruled the per se rules against nonprice 
restraints and resale price maintenance, it adopted the rule of reason 
advocated by the Harvard School, rather than the Chicago preference for 
rules of per se legality.159 
Overall, the Chicago School attitude toward exclusionary practices was 
very benign, approaching per se legality for many of them. The Supreme 
Court has nearly always followed the Harvard approach of applying a rule 
 
156 Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 92 
(1960) (outlining how resale price maintenance benefits manufacturers who want their 
retailers to offer special services such as demonstrations of the product). 
157 This was almost certainly true of the original Dr. Miles case, in which RPM was 
facilitated by a retail druggists’ cartel. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 
U.S. 373 (1911); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 340-47 (1991) 
(describing a cartel of retail druggists that involved Dr. Miles, their supplier, in RPM). 
158 Stating the Chicago position is the late Wesley J. Liebeler. See Wesley J. Liebeler, 
Intrabrand “Cartels” Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1982) (arguing that intrabrand 
restrictions are not a concern of antitrust because they are not likely to restrict output). 
159 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 901 (2007) (overruling 
the previous per se rule and adopting a rule of reason in retail price maintenance cases); see 
also 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1620 (discussing the adoption of a rule of reason 
in Leegin and how it overruled the per se Dr. Miles rule that preceded it). 
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of reason but being rather strict about standards of proof.160 The net 
result is that plaintiffs lose many cases. Litigation under the rule of reason 
has become extremely costly, to the point that the antitrust laws no 
longer effectively protect competition. An important part of any antitrust 
agenda for the future must be making the rule of reason more capable of 
balanced administration. This means that the plaintiff’s prima facie case 
must be less elaborate and burdensome, and proof of defenses—where 
the information is generally in the possession of the defendant—must be 
more exacting. 
B. Other Supreme Court Departures from Chicago Antitrust 
The Chicago School has lost ground in the Supreme Court not only vis-
à-vis Harvard School antitrust but in other ways as well, and even when 
Justices vote against enforcement. Recent examples include161 the 
majority opinion in Ohio v. American Express,162 both opinions in Apple, 
Inc. v. Pepper,163 and the three-Justice dissent in the North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC case.164 
The American Express majority found that AmEx’s restraint on 
merchants’ practice of “steering” customers from high cost AmEx to 
cheaper cards suggested that the latter were free riding on AmEx’s 
investment.165 The free rider problem has a distinctly Chicago School 
origin,166 but the majority completely flubbed the economics. As the 
dissent correctly pointed out, the majority overlooked the fact that 
AmEx’s perks are not awarded simply for card possession; rather, they are 
given only for transactions actually made with the American Express 
 
160 See also Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 
100 IOWA L. REV. 2039, 2059 (2015) (noting a shift from the Chicago to Harvard view in the mid-
1980s); Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 597 (“The Supreme Court has nearly always followed 
the Harvard approach.”); William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of U.S. 
Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2020). 
161 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); see POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 
2001), supra note 151, at 30 (arguing that California Dental was too naïve about collusion). 
162 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2279 (2018) (Thomas, J.). 
163 Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2019) (5-4 decision) (Kavanaugh, J.); id. at 
1525 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
164 North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 516 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
165 See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2289-90 (“Amex’s competitors have exploited its higher 
merchant fees to their advantage.”). 
166 See Telser, supra note 156, at 91. 
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card.167 As a result, free riding was not possible: AmEx was able to capture 
all of the returns for its card user perks.168 
In a clear assault on economics, and citing neither evidence nor 
argument, the Court also held as a matter of law that a relevant market 
must be identified in a vertical restraints case whether or not power was 
better proven by direct means.169 The fact that all credit card transactions 
are digitized and recorded indicates that direct proof from observations 
of demand responses to price changes would be a superior device for 
assessing power in this market. The Court’s statement of this position is 
regressive and discussed none of the relevant literature or arguments.170 
Finally, the Court stated an egregiously overgeneralized observation 
that on two-sided platforms, harms on one side will be offset by benefits 
on the other side.171 This amounts to assuming a conclusion of interest. 
In fact, the anti-steering rule at issue in this case harmed both sides of the 
market, the affected card holders as well as the merchants, by denying 
them the ability to make a more favorable deal.172 This was not Chicago 
School economics. It was economic nonsense. 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper reflects similar problems.173 In Illinois Brick v. 
Illinois, which preceded Apple v. Pepper, the Supreme Court held that only 
customers who purchase directly from a defendant can maintain a 
 
167 See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
168 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express 
Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 65 (2019) (explaining that free riding was not possible 
because “Amex rewards attach to specific transactions, not to mere possession of the card”). 
169 The Court’s complete statement of this conclusion was contained in a single although 
lengthy footnote: 
The plaintiffs argue that we need not define the relevant market in this case 
because they have offered actual evidence of adverse effects on competition—
namely, increased merchant fees. . . . We disagree. The cases that the plaintiffs 
cite for this proposition evaluated whether horizontal restraints had an adverse 
effect on competition . . . . Given that horizontal restraints involve agreements 
between competitors not to compete in some way, this Court concluded that it 
did not need to precisely define the relevant market to conclude that these 
agreements were anticompetitive . . . . But vertical restraints are different. . . . 
Vertical restraints often pose no risk to competition unless the entity imposing 
them has market power, which cannot be evaluated unless the Court first defines 
the relevant market. 
Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (internal citations omitted). 
170 Id.; Hovenkamp, supra note 168, at 50-52 (describing the Court’s explanation as a 
“confusing statement [that] appears to do no more than assume the conclusion”). 
171 Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2288. 
172 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 741 (2019) (“In every 
instance in which a merchant is injured by the steering restraint, there must also be an injured 
cardholder.”). 
173 Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
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damages action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.174 The jurisprudence 
of Illinois Brick has focused heavily on the difficulties of computing 
passed-on damages.175 Several states have amended their antitrust laws 
so as to permit passed-on damages, and the Supreme Court has 
permitted such statutes.176 The Apple majority, however, ignored the 
passing on issue and looked only at the fact that the plaintiffs paid money 
directly to the defendant.177 The dissenters also ignored the economic 
issue. They concluded that Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which gives a 
damages action to “any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property,”178 contains an implicit “proximate cause” requirement that 
limits damages to the first purchaser in line.179 That view harkens back to 
pre-marginalist nineteenth century tort law that rejected the conception 
of multiple causation in marginalist economics.180 
Speaking even on those terms, however, the dissenters seemed not to 
understand that the largest burden of the overcharge falls to the 
consumer, or the last purchaser in line. Only they are not in a good 
position to pass anything on.181 Indeed, many intermediaries suffer no 
overcharge injuries at all because they operate under markup procedures 
that pass all costs on. That is not to say that intermediaries are not 
injured; rather, their injury results from reduced transaction volume, not 
from the overcharge. A rule that might better compensate harmed parties 
is to give end users an overcharge cause of action for their damages, and 
intermediaries an action for lost profits resulting from reduced sales.182 
 
174 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977). 
175 See, e.g., 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶¶ 346, 346(a) (“The Court was 
concerned . . . with the problems of computing passing on, and the resulting potential for 
duplicative recovery . . . .”). On the rationale of the decision in the economics of passing on, see 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under 
the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 
(1979). On the complexities giving rise to the Apple litigation, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Apple 
v. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’s Indirect Purchaser Rule, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 14 (2019). 
176 See 14 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 2412(d) (summarizing state laws on 
passed-on damages and Supreme Court treatment of those laws); see also California v. ARC 
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105-06 (1989) (upholding state statutes allowing indirect purchasers to 
obtain damages). 
177 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521 (“The absence of an intermediary is dispositive.”). 
178 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
179 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1526-30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
180 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 134-42 (discussing the evolving conception of 
proximate cause in American jurisprudence). 
181 See 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 346 (noting that intermediaries may 
recover for their injury and the injury they pass on, whereas the consumer, frequently the 
“most injured party,” typically does not have standing to recover). 
182 See Hovenkamp, supra note 175, at 22 (proposing such a rule). 
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Neither AmEx nor the Apple v. Pepper dissent reflects sound economic 
analysis.183 They do represent a tortured effort to limit liability even when 
sound and up-to-date economics points in the other direction. While the 
Chicago critique properly ridiculed the inept economics of 1960s era 
antitrust decisions, the AmEx decision and Apple dissent are not one whit 
better. 
Finally, one area where the Chicago School recognized a serious threat 
of competitive harm was in the use of government to create monopoly. 
Stigler’s theory of regulation saw it principally as a form of private rent 
seeking rather than a reasonable response to market failure.184 Bork’s 
work echoed this same theme, speaking of predation through 
government process.185 Chicago School antitrust writers, including both 
Bork and Posner, advocated aggressive use of the antitrust laws in cases 
where the source of the restraint was government action. When Bork was 
Solicitor General, he advocated a liability-expanding “compulsion” 
requirement for antitrust’s “state action” doctrine.186 Posner actually 
advocated that there be no state action antitrust immunity for actions 
brought under the FTC Act.187 
By contrast, the Harvard School position, as developed in the original 
edition of the Antitrust Law treatise in 1978, rested on principles of 
federalism. It sought to distinguish the actions of a legitimate government 
decision maker from those taken at the behest of private entities. The 
Harvard School position did not inquire into the merits of a regulation, 
but only into its pedigree. The “state itself” could authorize any regulation 
it wished, provided that the authorization was clear. Private 
anticompetitive conduct would be approved, however, only if it was 
“actively supervised” by a government official.188 In its California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. decision, the Supreme Court 
 
183 See Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 2-3, 12 (arguing that Apple was “detached from the 
economic issue” and AmEx was “economically incoherent”). 
184 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
185 ROBERT H. BORK, Predation Through Governmental Process, in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 
supra note 16, at 347, 347-64. 
186 See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 616 (“[Bork’s] position was that an anticompetitive 
state rule was immune from federal antitrust scrutiny only if the state actually compelled the 
private party to act.”). 
187 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 761, 770 (2005) (applauding FTC’s attempts to deny state action immunity to actions 
brought under FTC Act). 
188 See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 213-14 (1978) (proposing 
the state authorization and active supervision rules). 
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adopted this test virtually verbatim, and it has governed the state action 
doctrine ever since.189 
The Chicago School would clearly have embraced the majority opinion 
in North Carolina Dental as an effective use of antitrust law to combat 
state-approved collusion. The dissenters suggested, however, that the 
case was an inappropriate attempt to interfere with a state scheme that 
was “not structured in a way that merits a good-government seal of 
approval.”190 
This switching of sides points to a motivation unrelated to the integrity 
of Chicago School or any other economic theory. Its principal effect is to 
deliver profits to those able to capture governmental processes. 
“Opportunistic Economics” has too often defined the approach of Chicago 
School antitrust scholars when confronted with cases involving regulation 
that limits competition. 
C. The Chicago and Harvard Schools and Antitrust Welfare Tests 
Neoclassical antitrust economics generally relied on a welfare 
“tradeoff” conception that evaluated practices by netting out gains and 
losses.191 A prime example is the Williamson model of mergers, which 
traded off consumer losses against productive efficiency gains.192 This 
conception of economic welfare was historically controlling in both 
Harvard and Chicago School economics literature, without significant 
dissent, through most of the heyday of the Harvard-Chicago debate.193 
 
189 See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980) (“These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity . . . . First, the 
challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state 
policy’; second, the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”) (citations omitted); 
see also Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 616-17 (discussing the adoption of the Harvard School 
position in Midcal). 
190 North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 516 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). See also Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 615-16 (comparing Justice Alito’s position, 
“that of a committed federalist,” to the position of the Chicago School). 
191 See, e.g., J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 699 (1939) 
(arguing that economic evaluation of gains and losses can guide policy choices to maximize 
social welfare); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (discussing costs and compensation in the 
policymaking setting). 
192 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 18, 21-22 (1968) (examining the tradeoff between cost savings and consumer losses). 
193 See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 
85 NYU L. REV. 659, 690 (2010) (describing how Chicago came to embrace the total welfare 
standard about a decade after Harvard). 
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Bork adopted that model in the late 1970s, but renamed it “consumer 
welfare.”194 
One problem with implementing the welfare tradeoff model is that it 
requires cardinal (i.e., quantified) measurements of productive efficiency 
gains and allocative efficiency losses—something courts cannot perform 
in any but the clearest of circumstances.195 Disagreeing with Williamson, 
Bork as well as Posner believed that efficiencies could not be measured 
in specific antitrust cases but must be presumed.196 The strength of that 
presumption has wreaked havoc with sensible antitrust analysis of 
conduct, for it typically entails that efficiencies will be presumed while 
harm, as outlined above, requires strong proof.197 
Another problem with the welfare tradeoff model is that it permits 
output reducing mergers if the gains to producers exceed the losses paid 
by consumers. By Williamson’s own calculations a relatively modest 
efficiency gain from a merger would suffice to offset a large price 
increase.198 Williamson neglected to ask whether it is common that a 
merger both reduces output and produces sufficient offsetting 
efficiencies to make the merger welfare positive. The typical merger that 
produces merger-specific marginal cost efficiencies increases output as 
well.199 Under the consumer welfare principle that we currently apply, 
merger efficiencies will be accepted only if they are sufficient to hold the 
price to pre-merger levels, meaning that there is no relevant welfare 
tradeoff.200 
Because protection of labor markets is a part of antitrust policy, higher 
output is also beneficial because it leads to competitive labor outcomes. 
Mergers that increase buyer market power, including for labor, will 
 
194 See BORK, supra note 16, at 105-08. 
195 Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2471, 2473-74 (2013) (describing the difficulties with a general welfare test in most cases); see 
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 733 (2017) 
(“Literal ‘balancing’ of competitive harms against efficiency gains is virtually impossible.”) 
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies]. 
196 See BORK, supra note 16, at 107-10, 128-29; POSNER, supra note 109, at 112 (arguing 
that efficiencies are practically impossible to measure); POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001), 
supra note 151, at 13 (adhering to this position in 2001). 
197 See supra note 160. 
198 Williamson, supra note 192, at 22-23 (“[A] relatively modest cost reduction is usually 
sufficient to offset relatively large price increases even if the elasticity of demand is as high as 
2, which is probably a reasonable upper bound.”). Areeda and Turner note this with apparent 
approval. See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 188, ¶ 940, at 149 n.2 (1980). 
199 See Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, supra note 195, at 709 (“Agencies . . . 
[agree] that most mergers are socially beneficial because they lead to cost reductions or 
improved output . . . .”). 
200 See id. 
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suppress wages.201 If those mergers create market power in the product 
market, they may also decrease product output which itself reduces the 
demand for labor.202 
In the original edition of the Antitrust Law treatise Areeda and Turner 
also adopted with no discussion a total welfare test for merger 
efficiencies.203 They also relied on Williamson and disagreed with Bork, 
arguing for strict proof requirements for efficiency claims.204 Under their 
approach not only must offsetting merger specific efficiencies be proven, 
but the defendant had the burden of proof,205 with proof requirements 
that became quite stringent as the merger’s anticompetitive potential 
loomed larger.206 The result is that few defendants have succeeded in 
proving the requisite efficiencies. The courts have generally followed this 
approach. Provable efficiencies must produce lower marginal costs and 
therefore prices. Subsequent editions of Antitrust Law largely abandoned 
the welfare tradeoff statement of the efficiencies defense, substituting a 
requirement that efficiencies must be sufficient to preclude any price 
increase from occurring. This amounts to a modified consumer welfare 
test and is the one incorporated in the current (2010) Merger 
Guidelines.207 
CONCLUSION 
When economic policy takes the model of perfect competition as its 
starting point, it has nowhere to go but downhill. If we did have a perfectly 
competitive economy, then of course antitrust intervention would be 
unnecessary. Faced with the choice of moving to models that provided 
greater verisimilitude and predictability, but that required more 
intervention, or clinging to the past, the Chicago School chose the latter. 
In the face of contrary evidence, the Chicago School provided a set of 
tools that required stringent proof burdens if only to prove the obvious, 
 
201 See Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor 
Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1035-36, 1038 (2019). 
202 See id. at 1035-36, 1038 (describing how increased concentration can lead to 
coordinated decreased output and wage suppression). Ordinarily such a merger will decrease 
the merging firms’ output; whether it results in higher prices depends on whether the firms 
have power in the output market. 
203 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 188, ¶ 940, at 149 & n.2 (1980). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. ¶ 941 at 154. 
206 Id. ¶ 962 at 197. 
207 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FCC, supra note 116, § 10 (requiring an enforcement agency 
to “consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s 
potential to harm customers in the relevant market”); see also 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 74, ¶¶ 971-73. 
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while accepting efficiency claims without serious examination. Those who 
stood to gain from this were firms with market power, at the expense of 
consumers and labor. The result was one of the most complete cases of 
regulatory capture in economic history, certainly far greater than any of 
the excesses of the New Deal. Recent decisions such as AmEx and the 
Apple v. Pepper dissent suggest that at least some Supreme Court Justices, 
unable to find coherent economic rationales for their positions, have 
abandoned antitrust economics altogether. 
 
 
